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CAN You EVER BEAT THE BOARD? CHALLENGES TO




The legislative reapportionment process has long been one of the
most controversial elements of our representative form of government.I
Rare is the apportionment plan that goes unchallenged by those
adversely affected by a new district configuration.2 And while some
principles of reapportionment, like the one person, one vote rule3 and
the recognition of an injury based on racial gerrymandering, 4 place
protective restrictions on the process, one much-maligned abuse remains
in full force in most states-political gerrymandering.5  The persistence
of political gerrymandering is variously attributed to the zero-sum
nature of the political process,6 the historical American emphasis on the
community over the party,7  and the lack of judicially manageable
* I would like to thank Professor Michael Solimine for his invaluable guidance during the
research and writing process.
1. See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887 (2006) [hereinafter
Gardner, Representation Without Party] ("American state legislatures have a long history of
gerrymandering; the practice got its name, after all, from an 1812 districting plan designed by
Republicans to keep the Massachusetts state senate from falling into Federalist hands.").
2. See James A. Gardner, How to Do Things with Boundaries: Redistricting and the
Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399, 399 (2012) [hereinafter Gardner, Things with
Boundaries] ("Litigation over districting plans enacted following the 2010 census has erupted in at least
half the states.").
3. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 560-61 (1964) ("[T]he fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of
equal representation for equal numbers of people.").
4. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) ("[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment
statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation .. . rationally
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters ... on the basis of race.").
5. Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 1, at 885-86 ("State legislatures ... seem
to redistrict with increasing boldness, barely bothering to disguise efforts to secure partisan
advantage.").
6. L. Sandy Maisel et al., The Impact of Redistricting on Candidate Emergence, in PARTY
LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 31, 46 (Thomas E. Mann &
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005) ("The redistricting processes currently used in most of the states ... are
dominated either by political parties or by incumbents; neither favors more competition. Parties want to
reduce the number of seats in which they must wage expensive campaigns. Incumbents do not want to
lose.").
7. Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L.
979
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standards in reviewing alleged political abuses in reapportionment.8
Nonetheless, many states have made efforts to curb partisan-influenced
redistricting through constitutional mandates of political neutrality9 and
the creation of independent redistricting commissions.10
Like many states, Ohio's history is rife with controversial
apportionment plans and with federal- and state-level challenges to new
apportionment schemes." One of the most recent and noteworthy of
these challenges, Wilson v. Kasich,12 was decided by the Supreme Court
of Ohio on November 27, 2012. The relators in Wilson v. Kasich, Ohio
voters who claimed that the apportionment board had failed to follow
constitutional mandates in redrawing the Ohio General Assembly
districts,13 argued that the 2012 apportionment plan violated Article XI
of the Ohio Constitution and was drawn for partisan gain.14
Wilson v. Kasich is a significant Ohio decision for two key reasons.
First, it established a burden of unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt for challenges to apportionment board decisions. Second, it
REV. 1379, 1404 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Redistricting] (noting the "enduring American
commitment to geographic districting"); see also Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 1,
at 968 ("[S]tate constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions ... have no real utility in preventing
partisan gerrymandering because they are aimed at a completely different problem: preserving the
integrity of [local communities of interest].").
8. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
("When presented with a claim of injury from partisan gerrymandering, courts are confronted with two
obstacles. First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral
boundaries ... [s]econd is the absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.").
9. DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 2A ("Each new Representative District shall, insofar as possible . .. not
be so created as to unduly favor any person or political party."); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 21 ("No
apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an
incumbent."); HAW. CONST. art. 4, § 6 ("No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or
political faction."); WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 43 ("The commission's plan shall not be drawn purposely to
favor or discriminate against any political party or group.").
10. Justin Levitt, A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2010)
("[S]ix states draw their legislative districts using independent commissions of individuals who are not
themselves legislators or other public officials."); but see James A. Gardner, Voting and Elections, in
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, VOLUME 3, at 145, 163 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) ("It is not clear . .. that allocating redistricting authority to commissions
will solve the problem of partisan gerrymandering.") and Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A
Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1834-35 (2012) [hereinafter Cain, Redistricting
Commissions] ("There are several common flaws in .. . independent citizen commission designs that are
particularly problematic in an era of heightened partisanship . . . . [C]ommissions [a]re explicitly
balanced in their membership, but there [i]s no specific provision or guidelines about the technical and
legal staff they would employ.").
11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Herbert v. Bricker, 41 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio 1942); King v. Rhodes, 228
N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1967); Armour v. State, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Voinovich v. Ferguson,
584 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio 1992); Quilter v. Voinovich, 981 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Parker v.
Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
12. Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012).
13. Complaint at 7, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019).
14. Id. at 6.
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maintained a disjunctive view of Article XI of the Ohio Constitution,
thereby allowing the apportionment board to violate certain provisions
of the article so long as it does so in furtherance of others.
This Casenote considers both the legal soundness and the future
implications of the court's holdings in Wilson v. Kasich. Part II
provides a background to the reapportionment process in Ohio,
including an explanation of the relevant federal and state constitutional
requirements. Part III addresses the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision
in Wilson v. Kasich. Part IV analyzes the decision, considering the
strength of the court's reasoning and the ramifications the decision may
have for future reapportionments. Finally, Part V concludes that the
court's adoption of an unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt
standard and the court's effective blessing of constitutional violations by
the apportionment board will create serious hurdles to potentially
meritorious reapportionment challenges in the future.
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT PROCESS
A. Federal Requirements for Reapportionment
Federal courts exert relatively little control over legislative
redistricting by the states. However, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and
federal case law have restricted the power of states to redistrict in two
areas: racial gerrymandering and malapportionment.16
The VRA prevents any voting "standard, practice, or procedure" from
denying or abridging "the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of
race or color."' In the years following the VRA, the United States
Supreme Court held that the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment
prevented legislative reapportionment from diluting or abridging the
voting rights of minorities. In recent years, as the Court has taken a
more conservative stance on affirmative-action-type schemes,19 and as
15. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) ("[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and
responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court."); see also
Gardner, Things with Boundaries, supra note 2, at 399.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2013).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2013). Although this Part of the Casenote discusses federal
requirements generally, note that Ohio is not covered by § 5 of the VRA, nor was § 2 invoked by the
relators in Wilson v. Kasich.
18. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been
to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.").
19. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Cronson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("[T]he standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) ("[A]ll
racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized."); Gratz
981
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the evils addressed by the VRA (particularly § 5) have arguably
dissipated,20 the Court has defined racial gerrymandering as the use of
any race-based classifications in reapportionment, reqardless of whether
the apportionment plan is meant to be a remedial one.
The problem of malapportionment has been addressed by the now-
famous one person, one vote rule,22 which requires that the portion of
representation given electoral districts substantially relates to the
percentage of the population contained in those districts.23 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that "[a] plan with larger disparities in
population [than 10%] creates a prima facie case of discrimination and
therefore must be justified by the State." 24  However, Ohio and other
states allow an even smaller deviance than the federal case law.25
Notwithstanding these significant reapportionment principles, there is
a conspicuous absence of federal guidelines with respect to political
gerrymandering.26 Although a plurality of the Supreme Court held in
Davis v. Bandemer that political gerrymandering affords a justiciable
cause of action, 27 a plurality of the Court later held in Vieth v. Jubelirer
that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable under the
political-question doctrine.28 And three dissenters in Vieth "proposed
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
20. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold § 5 as
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists."); see also Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down § 4(b) of the VRA and seriously threatening the future validity of
§ 5).
21. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of
lasting harm to our society . .. [r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters.") (emphasis added); see also ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES
COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 230-31 (1987) ("[C]ourts . . . have
neglected the statute's focus on fair process and come close to embracing the principle of group rights to
proportionate officeholding.").
22. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) ("A citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary
impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when
such impairment resulted from dilution."); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
23. See, e.g., 84 OHIO JUR. 3D STATE OF OHIO § 15 (2012) ("[T]he United States Constitution
requires that state legislative districts, or persons-per-legislator, be of nearly equal population so that
each person's vote may be given equal weight.").
24. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983).
25. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46.
26. See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643,644-45 (2004).
27. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
28. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004); see also MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING
RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 103 (2010) ("Under certain circumstances, federal and state courts will
refuse to reach the merits of cases properly before them, on the basis that the case presents a 'political
question' more properly resolved in the other branches of government.").
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/9
2014] CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN OHIO
separate (and conflicting) approaches for determining when
gerrymanders cross the constitutional line."29 So while the entire Court
apparently acknowledges that political gerrymandering can be
impermissible,3 0 "[t]he Court's attempts to decide .. . when power is
unfairly distributed among parties . .. has foundered on its inability to
agree on a normative baseline of fair power distribution from which
deviations might be measured."31  For this reason, allegations of pure
political gerrymandering (without some other legal or constitutional
violation) are more frequently brought in state courts where, in states
that disallow politically motivated reapportionment, they tend to fare
much better.32
B. Reapportionment in Ohio
Article XI of the Ohio Constitution governs reapportionment of state
legislative districts. Before 1851, Ohio's legislative districts were
drawn by the General Assembly itself, "with the result that oftentimes
political advantage was sought to be gained by the party in power." 34 At
least partly in response to the proliferation of gerrymandering, the
Constitution of 1851 created an apportionment board whose
reapportionment decisions were not subject to legislative approval. 35 In
1967, Ohio voters adopted the current version of Article XI, which
imported principles of one person, one vote, by setting the maximum
population deviation to plus or minus 5% in legislative districts. 36
Five members comprise Ohio's apportionment board: (1) the
Governor, (2) the State Auditor, (3) the Secretary of State, (4) "one
person chosen by the [S]peaker of the House of Representatives and the
leader in the Senate of the political party of which the [S]peaker is a
member," and (5) "one person chosen by the legislative leaders in the
two houses of the major political party of which the [S]peaker is not a
member." 37 Following each decennial census, the apportionment board
29. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 7, at 1382.
30. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I do not
understand the plurality to conclude that partisan gerrymandering that disfavors one party is permissible.
Indeed, the plurality seems to acknowledge it is not.").
31. Gardner, Things with Boundaries, supra note 2, at 399.
32. See DIMINO ET AL., supra note 28, at 104.
33. OHIO CONST. art. XI.
34. Herbert v. Bricker, 41 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1942).
35. See 84 OHIO JUR. 3D STATE OF OHIO § 16 (2012) ("The purpose was to place legislative
apportionment in the hands of a separate board not subject to the control of the General Assembly.").
36. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 3 (however, pursuant to § 10(B), when a whole county would have a
variance of only 20% if made into a district, the county "may be designated a representative district");
see also Mark A. Gabis, One Person, One Vote, 5 N. KY. L. REV. 241,263-69 (1978).
37. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1. The members of the apportionment board that adopted the plan
983
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"shall convene .. . between August 1 and October 1" and adopt a plan of
apportionment to be published by the Governor "no later than October 5
of th[at] year." 38
To determine the target population of each district, § 2 provides that
"[t]he whole population of the state ... shall be divided by the number
'ninety-nine' [the number of House districts in the state] and the
quotient shall be the ratio of representation in the House of
Representatives." 39  Likewise, the ratio of representation for the Senate
is determined by dividing the whole state population by thirty-three.40
Section 3 of the Article (or "the proportionality provision") enshrines
the principle of one person, one vote by mandating that no district may
deviate from the ratio of representation established under § 2 by more
than 5% (except where an entire county is being preserved as a district,
in which case there is an acceptable deviation of plus or minus 10%).41
The first clause of § 7(A) (or "the contiguity provision") provides that
every house district "shall be compact and composed of contiguous
territory" and bounded by a "single non-intersecting continuous line."42
In its simplest form, reapportionment is designating those counties
whose populations fall within the acceptable variance (either singly or in
combination) as house districts under the second clause of § 7(A) (or
"the whole-county provision").43  Where it is not possible to create a
district out of one or more whole counties, counties may be divided
under § 7(B) (or "the county-division provision") as long as districts are
"formed by combining areas of governmental units.'" Under § 8,
challenged in Wilson v. Kasich were, in order described above: (1) John Kasich, (2) David Yost, (3) Jon
Husted, (4) Thomas Niehaus, and (5) Armond Budish.
3 8. Id
39. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 2.
40. Id.
41. Id § 3 ("The population of each . . . district shall be substantially equal to the ratio of
representation in the House .. . and in no event shall any ... district contain a population of less than
ninety-five per cent nor more than one hundred five per cent of the ratio of representation . . . except in
those instances where reasonable effort is made to avoid dividing a county in accordance with section
9."); see also id. § § 9 and 10(B).
42. Id § 7(A).
43. Id. § 7(A) ("To the extent consistent with the requirements of section 3 of this Article, the
boundary lines of districts shall be so drawn as to delineate an area containing one or more whole
counties."); id § 9 ("In those instances where the population of a county is not less than ninety percent
nor more than one hundred ten percent of the ratio of representation . .. reasonable effort shall be made
to create a . . . district consisting of the whole county."); id. § 10(A) ("Each county containing
population substantially equal to one ratio of representation ... but in no event less than ninety-five per
cent nor more than one hundred five per cent of the ratio shall be designated a representative district.")
(emphasis added); id. § 10(B) ("Each county containing population between ninety and ninety-five
percent of the ratio or between one hundred five and one hundred ten per cent of the ratio may be
designated a representative district.") (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 7(B) ("Where the requirements of section 3 .. .cannot feasibly be attained by forming a
district from a whole county or counties, such district shall be formed by combining the areas of
984 [VOL. 82
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though, when a county is divided it may have only as many districts
wholly within its boundaries as it has ratios of representation under
45§ 2. Where it is not possible to create a district without dividing a
governmental unit, § 7(C) (or "the unit-division provision") provides
that only one governmental unit may be divided between any two
districts. 6 Under § 7(D) (or "the district-preservation provision"), the
apportionment board shall also readopt boundaries established in the
previous apportionment plan "to the extent reasonably consistent with
the requirements of section 3 ."4
III. WILSON V. KASICH
Unlike federal courts, whose authority to hear reapportionment cases
is controlled by the prudential, political-question barrier,48 the Supreme
Court of Ohio is vested with "exclusive, original jurisdiction in all cases
arising under" Article XI of the Ohio Constitution.4 9 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Ohio is not kept from reaching the merits of suits brought
under Article XI for the same reasons that federal courts might be.50
The relators in Wilson v. Kasich argued both that the apportionment
board "flouted Article XI's requirements" and that it did so for
improper, politically motivated reasons.5 1 Part A discusses the facts and
procedure of the case. Part B details the court's resolution of the issues
presented.
governmental units."). The term "governmental unit" includes townships, municipalities, city wards,
cities, and villages. Id. § 7(B)-(C).
45. Id. § 8 ("Any remaining territory within such county containing a fraction of one whole ratio
of representation shall be included in one representative district by combining it with adjoining territory
outside the county."); see also id. § 10(C).
46. Id. § 7(C).
47. Id. § 7(D) ("In making a new apportionment, district boundaries established by the preceding
apportionment shall be adopted to the extent reasonably consistent with the requirements of section 3 of
this Article."). How this provision affects the operation of the other provisions will be discussed at
length below.
48. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004).
49. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 13 (emphasis added).
50. See DIMINO ET AL., supra note 28, at 104 ("[T]he [political-question] doctrine has been
applied less robustly by many state courts, in part because state constitutions are typically much longer
and more detailed than the Federal Constitution, and seem to call for more judicial interpretation and
application of those provisions."); see also David Schultz, Redistricting and the New Judicial
Federalism: Reapportionment Litigation Under State Constitutions, 37 RUTGERs L.J. 1087, 1132 (2006)
("As the federal courts either retreat from redistricting issues, are unable to resolve political
gerrymandering questions, or are throwing the issues of malapportionment back to states . . . state
constitutions appear to be becoming more important tools for resolving legal disputes.").
51. Complaint, supra note 13, at 6.
985
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A. Facts and Procedural History
In accordance with Article XI, § 1, the apportionment board and its
joint secretaries began meeting in early August 2011 to plan a new
apportionment scheme for Ohio's General Assembly. 52  After over a
month of meetings, the board approved an apportionment plan on
September 28, 2011, with a vote of 4 to 1 (along party lines). 53
Communications among the board members and the joint secretaries
revealed that the reaportionment process had been highly (albeit
rationally) politicized. Secretary Mann distributed "political indexes"
for each house district from the previous reapportionment that served as
a metric for redrawing the districts in a way favorable to Republican
politicians.55  Secretary Mann described the indexes to the board
members, explaining that "[p]reviously to retain a 50+ seat majority
under 2008 Presidential year conditions, we had to win all seats above a
49. 14%- now we only have to hold 50 or more seats that are 50.94% or
better." 6 In an email between the secretaries, Secretary Mann stated
that Democrats "hold 6 of our 50%+ seats ... at least they do now." 57
In yet another communication between the board secretaries, Secretary
DiRossi noted that "we have made significant improvements to many
[House districts on this list ... [h]opefully saving millions over the
coming years." 5  Both board secretaries subsequent !' acknowledged
that the political indexes could "affect future elections."
In January 2012, the relators brought suit against the four Republican
members of the apportionment board.6 0  The relators sought "a
declaration that the decennial apportionment plan adopted by [the board]
52. Affidavit of Dr. Michael P. McDonald in Support of Complaint at 5, Wilson v. Kasich, 981
N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019) [hereinafter McDonald Affidavit].
53. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 818.
54. See infra note 59.
55. Complaint, supra note 13, at 14; Appendix of Exhibits to Affidavit of Lloyd Pierre-Louis at
421-25, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019) [hereinafter Pierre-Louis
Exhibits]; Exhibits to Depositions of Raymond DiRossi and Heather Mann at 26, Wilson v. Kasich, 981
N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019).
56. Pierre-Louis Exhibits, supra note 55, at 348 (email from Mann to Board members).
57. Id. at 206 (email from Mann to DiRossi).
58. McDonald Affidavit, supra note 52, at Exhibit B-3.
59. Relators' Supplemental Brief at 10, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No.
2012-0019). See Deposition of Raymond E. DiRossi at 172, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio
2012) (No. 2012-0019) ("This is kind of a before and after analysis of the proposed House districts and
what changes those 99 districts would have in terms of a political index."); Deposition of Heather N.
Mann at 73, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019) (acknowledging that
"while under the existing map, the number of Republican House districts with an index of 55 percent or
better was 36, on the new map it would be 44 seats that would have an index of 55 percent or better").
60. "Relators are [thirty-six] Ohio voters who live in districts that were drawn in violation of
Article XI and adopted in violation of the Sunshine Act." Complaint, supra note 13, at 7-10.
8
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is invalid under Article XI and the Open Meetings Act and a prohibitory
injunction preventing respondents from conducting elections using the
state legislative districts set forth in the plan."6' The relators argued that
the apportionment board, as a "public body" under Ohio's Sunshine Act,
violated its duty to "take official action and to conduct all
deliberations ... only in open meetings."62 Furthermore, the relators
argued that the board intentionall! violated the dictates of Article XI for
impermissible, political reasons.
On February 17, 2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the
relators' O en Meetings Act claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and held that the relators' request for an injunction was
barred by laches. Then, on March 2, 2012, the court entered an order
requiring the parties to file briefs responding to four questions: (1)
whether the court has jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the
relators brought suit against only four of the five members of the
apportionment board; (2) whether the Ohio Constitution mandates
political neutrality; (3) what is the burden of proof in establishing that an
action by the apportionment board is unconstitutional; and (4) whether
tension exists among the provisions of Article XI and how those
66tensions ought to be reconciled. These are the issues the court
resolved in Wilson v. Kasich.
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice O'Donnell wrote the court's majority opinion in Wilson v.
67Kasich. After providing a general description of the reapportionment
process, outlining the facts of the case, and noting that reapportionment
is an inherently political process,6 8 Justice O'Donnell answered the
61. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 818.
62. Complaint, supra note 13, at 13; OHIo. REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (West 2012).
63. Complaint, supra note 13, at 6.
64. Wilson v. Kasich, 963 N.E.2d 1282, 1283 (Ohio 2012) ("[W]ithout the applicability of
Article XI, Section 13 to relators' open-meetings claim, we lack jurisdiction over this claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief.").
65. Id at 1284; see also State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 757 N.E.2d
1135, 1138 (Ohio 2001) ("A relator seeking extraordinary relief in an election-related matter bears the
burden of establishing that the relator acted with the required diligence, and if the relator fails to do so,
laches may bar the action.").
66. Order of March 2, 2012, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019),
available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/pdf viewer/pdf viewer.aspx?pdf-190807.pdf.
67. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 817.
68. Id. ("Apportionment is primarily a political and legislative process ... and as a result, both
courts and scholars have universally agreed that politics cannot be divorced from the process.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). Saying that reapportionment is inherently political, however, is not the same
as acknowledging that the state constitution sanctions politically motivated reapportionment;
presumably, Justice O'Donnell would agree that states like Delaware and Florida have removed politics
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major questions presented to the parties for briefing.
1. Political Neutrality
After quickly disposing of the jurisdictional issue, the majority
proceeded to ascertain whether the Ohio Constitution prohibits political
considerations in reapportionment. The court stated that its "primary
concern ... is to determine the intent of the electorate in adopting"
Article XI by examining the text of the article. 70 The majority held that
political neutrality was not explicitly required by the text of Article XI;
indeed, by its terms, Article XI does not even require "politically
competitive districts or representational fairness."7' Justice O'Donnell
compared the language of the Ohio Constitution to those state
constitutions that do explicitly mandate political neutrality, finding that
states intending to restrict political considerations "specify in either
constitutional or statutory language that no apportionment plan shall be
drawn with the intent of favoring or disfavoring a political party." 72
Thus, the majority concluded, Article XI "does not prevent the board
from considering partisan factors."73
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that "political considerations
cannot override the requirements of Article XI." 74 Because the article
neither forbids nor condones consideration of partisan factors, the
predominating concern must be adherence to the constitutional
requirements of reapportionment.75
2. Burden of Proof
"Although a board's apportionment plan is not a statute," the majority
held, "the same general principle applies to resolving relators' attack on
the constitutionality of the apportionment plan as that which applied to
attacks on ... statutes." 76 This is because: (1) the duty to reapportion
from the reapportionment process by operation of law. More on this infra Part III.B.2.
69. The majority held that while "it remains better practice in this type of action to name the
board and all its members as parties," the fact that only four of the five board members were made
parties was not fatal to the action. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 819.
70. Id. at 820.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. (citing In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, 83 So. 3d 597 (Fla.
2012)); see also supra note 9.
73. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 820.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 821.
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was "previously conferred on the General Assembly;"77 (2) there is a
general presumption that public officers perform their duties "in a
regular and lawful manner;"78 (3) Ohio voters took the authority to
apportion from the General Assembly and gave it to the apportionment
board, which evidences a greater degree of trust in the board;79 and, (4)
many other jurisdictions have given legislative-type deference to
reapportionment decisions.80
For these reasons, the majority held that the proper burden of proof
for challenging Ohio apportionment board decisions is for the "one
challenging the constitutionality of an apportionment plan ... to
establish that the plan is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."8
3. Article XI
With the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as guidance, the
majority proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the challenged
apportionment plan. The court acknowledged, as the respondents had
frankly admitted, that violations of the letter of Article XI occurred. 82
However, the court began its discussion of Article XI's different
provisions by noting that the article "vests the apportionment board with
considerable discretion in formulating an appropriate plan."83
According to the majority, the broad, discretionary language of Article
XI allows the board to make its own decisions in reconciling potentially
conflicting provisions.84 As the majority noted, Article XI itself
provides no clear guidance for dealing with provisions that are in
tension with one another. Instead, the board is given the power to
follow certain constitutional dictates, even at the expense of violating
others, if it would be impossible to honor each and every requirement
under Article XI.85
Under the majority's reading of Article XI, while the county-division
and unit-division provisions are fallbacks to the whole-county and
county-division provisions respectively, the district-preservation
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Skaggs v. Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982 (Ohio 2008)); see also 42 OHIO JUR. 3D
EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES § 118 (2012).
79. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 821.
80. Id at 822 (citing Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2006); Logan v. O'Neill, 448
A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1982); McClure v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 766 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002); In re
Wolpoff, 600 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 1992)).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 825.
83. Id. at 824 (citing OHIO CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 7(A)-{D)).
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provision is a separate and coequal constitutional mandate that
"boundaries established by the preceding apportionment ... be adopted
to the extent reasonably consistent with the requirements of section 3."86
Therefore, the board might have to choose between maintaining the
status quo at the expense of violating the geographical requirements of
§ 7(A)-(C) or redrawing districts to honor § 7(A)-(C) at the expense of
disrupting the status quo under the district-preservation provision.
Given the broad discretion wielded by the apportionment board, and the
highly deferential standard of review, the majority refused to "order
respondents to correct the alleged violations of Sections 7(A), (B), and
(C) by committing a violation of Section 7(D)."
The majority went even further, however, and held that the
discretionary, "to the extent reasonably consistent with ... section 3"
language of the district-preservation provision "confers the authority on
the apportionment board to adopt district boundaries that are not
identical to those used in the prior apportionment."89 Thus, according
to the court, not only is the district-preservation provision coequal with
§ 7(A)-(C), but the "discretionary language" of the provision entitles the
apportionment board to "readopt" district boundaries that did not
technically exist in the first place.
So while the majority acknowledged that the reapportionment divided
counties seventy-four times, and governmental units many times as well,
it was not willing to hold that the apportionment board had violated the
Ohio Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt or to require the board to
correct its "alleged" violations of § § 7 and 10. The court held that the
relators failed to meet their heavy burden of proving that the
Constitution had been violated because (1) the relators' arguments
rested on an incorrect interpretation of Article XI, § 7,92 (2) it is
irrelevant whether a "better" apportionment plan exists so long as the
apportionment plan adopted does not violate the Constitution,93 and (3)
86. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7(D).
87. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 825. One major point of contention was the division of noncontiguous
local governmental units, or units whose boundaries are not single, contiguous lines. The relators
argued that § 7(A)-(C) applied to such units, whereas the respondents argued that noncontiguous units
had historically been treated differently from contiguous units. The majority sided with the respondents,
pointing out that "the division of noncontiguous governmental units [is] accomplished by local officials
through annexation rather than by the board through apportionment." Id. at 825. Thus, the majority was
not willing to hold the apportionment board responsible for dividing that which had already been
divided.
88. Id. at 826.
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the relators' expert evidence was "conclusory" and "unreliable." 94
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Pfeifer's dissent, joined by Chief Justice O'Connor and Justice
McGee Brown, attacked the majority's adoption of an unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. "There is no basis," Justice Pfeifer
argued, "in the Ohio Constitution, in fairness, in justice, or in political
reality for this court to cloak the apportionment board's actions with a
presumption of constitutionality that can be overcome only by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."95 Rather, when the drafters of Article XI
created the present scheme, they clearly anticipated challenges to
apportionment plans, which is shown by § 13's vesting of original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Ohio and process for correcting
constitutional violations by the apportionment board. 96 It makes little
sense, argued Justice Pfeifer, to put these safeguards in place if
apportionment board decisions would be nearly impossible to overturn.
Justice Pfeifer rejected the majority's reasoning that the apportionment
board's membership of "public officials" is of special significance; "that
public officials are presumed to have acted lawfully," he argued, does
not mean "that the constitutionality of their work product can be
overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."97
Justice Pfeifer also criticized the majority's reading of the district-
preservation provision as being a separate and coequal consideration in a
reapportionment decision.98 He argued that the district-preservation
provision cannot possibly be coequal, because "a board could justify the
adoption of an incumbent-protecting apportionment plan and forgo any
effort to achieve compactness and minimize splits of governmental
units." 99 If § 7(A)-(C) do not control the district-preservation provision,
Justice Pfeifer argued, the court must affirm "patently unconstitutional"
apportionment plans enacted pursuant to the district-preservation
provision but in contravention of the rest of § 7.100 Although Justice
Pfeifer described himself as "reluctant" to do so, he would have held
that because of "serial violations of the Section 7 constitutional mandate
for compactness of legislative districts and minimization of
94. Id at 827.
95. Id. at 828 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 13).
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governmental-unit splits .. . remapping is required."' 0'
Justice McGee Brown, joined by Chief Justice O'Connor, similarly
criticized the criminal-case-level deference the majority gave to
decisions of the apportionment board.102 Instead, Justice McGee Brown
"would hold that once relators make a prima facie showing beyond a
reasonable doubt that respondents have violated a provision. . . the
burden of proof shifts to respondents to justify that violation based on
the avoidance of a violation of another" law.'0 3
On the proper construction of Article XI, Justice McGee Brown's
dissent differed from Justice Pfeifer's.104 Justice McGee Brown agreed
with Justice O'Donnell and the majority that the district-preservation
provision is a coequal provision to § 7(A)-(C). 05  However, she noted
that the explicit command of the district-preservation provision is that
"the preceding apportionment plan shall be adopted' when it would be
consistent with the proportionality provision to do so.106 Justice McGee
Brown therefore rejected the respondents' argument that the district-
preservation provision allows districts to be altered "to the extent
possible" to conform to the previous apportionment plan. o7 Rather, if a
district has been altered at all the apportionment board cannot justify
that decision using the district-preservation provision fobecause the
section requires that the previous district be adopted as is.
Applying her preferred standard of review, Justice McGee Brown
found that the relators made a prima facie showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the whole-county and district-preservation provisions were
violated; thus, the burden ought to have shifted to the respondents to
justify their actions. 109
101. Id at 830.
102. Id at 832-33 (McGee Brown, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 833. Thus, instead of having to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the entire
apportionment plan is unconstitutional, the relators would only have to show that a constitutional
violation occurred. As she notes later in her dissent, Justice McGee Brown certainly believes a
constitutional violation had occurred.
104. Id. at 834. This makes it somewhat puzzling that Chief Justice O'Connor joined both
dissents even though they differ significantly on an important question of law.
10 5. Id.
106. Id. at 838 (citing OHIO CONST. art XI, § 7(D)) (emphasis added).
107. Response of Respondents Governor John Kasich, Senate President Thomas E. Niehaus, and
Auditor David Yost to Supplemental Merit Brief of Relators at 21, Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814
(Ohio 2012) (No. 2012-0019) ("The only practical understanding of Section 7(D) is that new districts, to
the extent possible, should be drawn, when balanced against other directives from Article XI, in light of
population changes, to conform to the prior plan.").
108. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 835 ("By applying a malleable standard of substantial deference to
previous district lines, an apportionment board could condone a myriad of violations of Article XI to
achieve partisan gain.").
109. Id. at 833, 838.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF REAPPORTIONMENT
The court in Wilson v. Kasich erected a nearly insurmountable barrier
to challenges to apportionment board decisions and empowered the
board to follow its preferred Article XI provisions while violating
others. This Part of the Casenote analyzes the court's reasoning and the
future implications for reapportionment in Ohio under Wilson v. Kasich.
Part A examines the soundness of imposing a burden of unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt upon litigants challenging an apportionment
plan. Part B examines the court's reading of Article XI and its decision
to vest considerable discretion in the apportionment board when
"reconciling" the article's provisions. Part C considers the ramifications
of Wilson v. Kasich and attempts to explore the outer limits of what an
apportionment board might be allowed to "get away with" given the
current state of the law.
A. Too Heavy of a Burden
One of the most significant and detrimental legal consequences of
Wilson v. Kasich is the imposition of an inappropriately high burden of
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt on challenges to Ohio
apportionment board decisions.110 Although the proper burden of proof
in reapportionment cases had not been explicitly decided in Ohio (the
question was only tangentially addressed in cases like Voinovich v.
Ferguson) the majority of the court conclusively determined that the
apportionment board's decisions were owed the highest deference.Ill
To support this proposition, the majority cited a number of cases from
jurisdictions outside of Ohio.112 However, most of the cases cited either
do not support an unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt standard
as unequivocally as the majority made it seem or do not arise in a
jurisdiction whose reapportionment procedures are significantly similar
to Ohio's.
The majority cited Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission to support the
I10. Id. at 822 (majority opinion).
Il l. Id. at 821 (citing Voinovich v. Ferguson, 586 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ohio 1992) (Holmes, J.,
concurring)) ("[T]he apportionment made must so far violate the rules prescribed by the constitution, as
to enable us to say, that what has been done is no apportionment at all, and should be wholly
disregarded."). Not only did the one-page, per curiam decision in Voinovich not address the issue of
burden of proof, but Justice Holmes' opinion does not clearly support an unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt standard either.
112. Id at 821-22 (citing Ariz. Minority Voting Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm., 208 P.3d 676 (Ariz. 2009); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2006);
Logan v. O'Neill, 448 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1982); McClure v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 766 N.E.2d
847 (Mass. 2002); In re Wolpoff, 600 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 1992)).
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contention that redistricting decisions are legislative in nature and
should therefore be accorded special deference.11 3  Although the
Arizona Supreme Court gave deference to the redistricting
commission's decision, nowhere in its opinion did the court impose a
burden of unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt;' 14 instead, the
court held that "when there is a reasonable, even though debatable, basis
for the enactment of a [redistricting decision], we will uphold the act
unless it is clearly unconstitutional."" s While the difference may seem
to be merely semantic, clear unconstitutionality is not the same as
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. For instance, one would
likely not say that the burden of proof at a criminal trial is "clear
guilt."I 16
In addition, the composition of Arizona's redistricting commission is
starkly different from that of Ohio's apportionment board." 7  The
Arizona redistricting commission is comprised of five members, no
more than two of whom can be affiliated with the same party, and none
of whom can "have been appointed to, elected to, or a candidate for any
other public office" within the previous three years. " The diverse
makeup of Arizona's independent commission therefore suggests that
deference is not only appropriate but also necessary to ensure that the
commission is free to carry out its constitutionally appointed function.1 19
The Wilson v. Kasich majority also cited Parella v. Montalbano,
which unequivocally held that the redistricting plan at issue had to be
proved unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.120 However, unlike
in Ohio, Rhode Island's General Assembly itself enacts the redistricting
plans for the state's house and senate districts.121 The same is true for
113. Id. at 821.
114. Ariz. Minority Voting Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm., 208
P.3d 676 (Ariz. 2009).
115. Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1.03(5) (2009), available at
http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu/judges/jurycharges/OtherPJI/6th%2OCircuit%20Pattem%2OCriminal
%20Jury/o20Instructions.pdf ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof which is so convincing
that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most important decisions in your own
lives."); see also PAUL C. GIANNELLI & BARBARA ROOK SNYDER, I BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. EvI).
§ 301.3 (2012) ("The 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard is the most difficult standard to satisfy and is
used almost exclusively in criminal cases.").
117. ARIZ. CONST. art IV, part II, § 1(3).
118. Id.
119. See Cain, Redistricting Commissions,supra note 10, at 1830.
120. Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1233 (R.I. 2006) ("Because redistricting is a
legislative function . . . the trial justice was correct in allocating this time-honored burden of proof-
beyond a reasonable doubt-to the plaintiffs, who were challenging the constitutionality of the Senate
redistricting plan.").
121. R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 1 and art. VIII, § 1. The reapportionment at issue in Parella was
performed by a special commission and adopted by the General Assembly because of "complicated and
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reapportionment in Massachusetts and New York-jurisdictions from
which the Supreme Court of Ohio cited additional cases to support its
holding.122 And in Connecticut, a bipartisan reapportionment committee
creates a plan that is adopted by the general assembly.123 The need to
defer to a "legislative" redistricting decision is clearer in states where
the state legislature enacts apportionment plans, as the amount of
deference owed the duly elected representatives of the people is an
easier question than the amount owed to a five-person board in which
one party is disproportionately represented. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court has affirmed the legislative nature of redistricting
determinations in cases where a state legislature itself has adopted an
apportionment plan.125 The legislative nature of the apportionment
board's decisions, and thus the need for a very high level of deference to
those decisions, is far more dubious than in cases where an
apportionment plan is enacted by a state's general assembly.
To the extent that legislative deference is premised on the notion that
"in a democratic form of government, policy decisions should be made
by th[ose] . . .who are accountable to the people through elections,"1 2 6 it
is not clear that the apportionment board's members are entitled to this
presumption. Given that no member of the apportionment board is
directly placed in that position by public selection, it would be more
appropriate to characterize the members, for the purposes of
reapportionment, as public officers. As Justice Pfeifer noted in his
dissent, the mere fact that public officers are presumed to act lawfully
does not mean that their actions must be proved unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt.127
Ohio's apportionment board is comprised of three state executive
officers and (at most) two state legislators.128 So while redistricting may
problematic" issues that arose out of Rhode Island's 1994 government-reduction measures, which
"eliminated approximately one-quarter of the seats in the General Assembly." Parella, 899 A.2d at
1230.
122. MASS. CONST. art. CI, § 1; McClure v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 766 N.E.2d 847, 856
(Mass. 2002) ("[P]laintiffs must carry their burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the
departures they complain of are 'unreasonable."'); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5; In re Wolpoff, 600 N.E.2d
191, 194 (N.Y. 1992).
123. CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 6; Logan v. O'Neill, 448 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Conn. 1982) ("There is a
presumption of constitutionality which attaches to a statutory enactment; the burden which rests upon a
party asserting its invalidity is to establish that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.").
124. The apportionment board is not necessarily a reflection of the legislative will, as three
executive officers who may be elected by narrow margins represent 60% of the voting power on the
board (which in turn has the power to affect the outcome of future elections).
125. See Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 114 (1971).
126. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1447, 1469 (2010).
127. Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814, 829 (Ohio 2012).
128. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1. Although the two remaining members of the board will most
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be traditionally legislative, characterizing the decisions of the board as
legislation akin to that passed by the general assembly is disingenuous.
If one characterizes it instead as the action of public officers, then
presuming "that public officials . .. have acted lawfully" could mean
nothing more than that the burden of proof rests on the challenger.129
Furthermore, contrary to the majority's reasoning, the fact that the
power to reapportion was transferred from the general assembly to the
apportionment board in 1851 does not mean that both entities are
entitled to the same amount of deference.130 In fact, if the amendment
represented the electorate's response to how difficult it was to attack or
reverse legislative reapportionments, it would make little sense to give
the exact same presumption of validity to a much smaller group of
people. And given that a majority of the board will necessarily be
comprised of politically motivated actors (the governor, the state
auditor, and the secretary of state), it would be pointless for an electorate
concerned that "political advantage was sought to be gained by the party
in power" to give wide deference to a five-person board containing no
fewer than three politicians.131 There is no evidence that when the
electorate transferred the task of reapportionment to the apportionment
board it meant to also transfer legislative-type deference to the board's
decisions.
A more appropriate standard in this context is that used in New
Hampshire, where a court "will not hold [an apportionment plan] to be
unconstitutional unless a clear and substantial conflict exists between it
and the constitution."1 32  This is similar to Justice McGee Brown's
preferred burden of requiring challengers to make a "prima facie
showing beyond a reasonable doubt" that a constitutional violation has
occurred and then shifting the burden to the apportionment board.13 3 In
both instances, the challengers must show that the reapportionment
decision is in conflict with the constitutional requirements-not that an
entire plan and its justifications are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt. 34
likely always be state legislators, the language of § 1 describes them only as "person[s] chosen by" the
two major political parties in the General Assembly. The section does not explicitly require that these
board members be legislators, Ohio voters, or even adults.
129. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 829.
130. See id. at 828.
131. Herbert v. Bricker, 41 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1942); see also Gardner, Voting and Elections,
supra note 10, at 163 ("The political forces organizing legislatures may well reappear in redistricting
commissions.").
132. N.H. Health Care Ass'n v. Governor, 13 A.3d 145, 152 (N.H. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Note also that this was the level of deference given to the state legislature-not an
independent apportionment board.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio's role in Article XI reapportionment
decisions also calls into question the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Article XI, § 13 makes the supreme court the sole arbiter of
litigation between the apportionment board and challengers of its
decisions. In a similar context, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
because:
[i]t is this Court's duty, given to it by the citizens of Florida, to enforce
adherence to the constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting
plan that does not comply with those standards constitutionally
invalid ... [w]e reject the assertions . .. that a challenger must prove
facial invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. 135
Although the review processes in Ohio and Florida are not identical,
it is significant that the drafters of Article XI made the Supreme Court
of Ohio the watchdog of the constitutional validity of apportionment
plans. In this sense, the majority's handwringing over separation of
powers concerns is misplaced. The fact that Article XI makes the court
an integral part of reapportionment cuts against the need for such a high
level of deference to the board's decisions. As Justice Pfeifer noted in
dissent, "Article XI, Section 13 of the Ohio Constitution places on this
court the duty to answer [allegations of unconstitutionality] without
deference to either party."l36 The majority's ruling thus unduly
aggrandizes the apportionment board's power to make reapportionment
decisions and minimizes the court's own function to rule on the
constitutionality of apportionment plans.
B. Resolving Conflicting Mandates
1. The Theoretical Foundations of Article Xl's Provisions
One of the most troubling issues in Wilson v. Kasich was the apparent
tension among Article Xl's provisions.13 7 This tension is particularly
interesting in light of the theoretical foundations of these provisions.138
The conflict among the provisions might be summed up as competing
interests in community-based representation, voter equality, and
135. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597, 607 (Fla.
2012). Florida is different from Ohio, however, in that the Florida Supreme Court is constitutionally
mandated to pass on the validity of every apportionment plan drawn by the General Assembly. FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
136. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 828 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 818 (majority opinion) ("[W]e ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing... [whether] tension exist[s] among sections 3, 7, and 10 of Article XI of the Ohio
Constitution.").
138. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 7, at 1390.
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continuity. Sections 7(A)-(C) and 10 could be described as protecting
geographical integrity. Historically, "American jurisdictions agreed that
territorial communities existed and ought to be represented as such in
the legislature."l 39 On the other hand, the proportionality provision,
which imposes strict one person, one vote requirements, stands for the
proposition that all voters are created equal. Further still, the district-
preservation provision attempts to impose a measure of continuity on the
reapportionment process. The apportionment board is therefore given
the potentially impossible task of maintaining the integrity of counties
and governmental units, ensuring that each district hews to the equal
representation requirements of the proportionality provision, and
preserving the preexisting district boundaries. But "[i]n almost all areas,
communities [are] not equipopulous, meaning that the only way to
comply with the one-person, one-vote rule [i]s to countenance their
wholesale disruption,"1 40 and the constant fluctuation in district
populations can make compliance with the district-preservation
provision particularly difficult.
This is not to say that the apportionment board should violate the
Ohio Constitution with impunity; it is merely to note that resolving the
tension among Article XI's provisions will necessarily lead to choosing
one normative view of the reapportionment process over another. The
question, then, is who ought to be making a choice so foundational to
representative governance.
2. The Apportionment Board as Decision Maker
The problems with imposing an extremely high burden of proof
discussed in Part IV.A are further exacerbated by the court's resolution
of Article XI's tensions and essential redefinition of
'unconstitutionality.' In most instances, an action that violates the letter
of a constitutional provision is unconstitutional.141 However, the court
held in Wilson v. Kasich that a technical violation of Article XI, § 7 does
not by itself establish unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.142
Instead, violations of § 7(A)-(C) do not establish unconstitutionality if
the district-preservation provision is not violated.143 Furthermore, based
on the majority's construction of the district-preservation provision, the
apportionment board is not required to adopt a preexisting district
139. Id. t 1408.
140. id. at 1412.
141. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "unconstitutional" as "[c]ontrary
to or in conflict with a constitution").
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boundary as is-the board still complies with the provision even when it
reshapes the boundary, so long as its efforts are "reasonably consistent
with ... section 3."14 This is how the court has resolved the inherent
tensions within Article XI, § 7: it has given to the apportionment board
the power to choose how it would like to follow these constitutional
mandates.
Under the majority's reading of Article XI, the proportionality
provision is the only obvious constraint on the apportionment board's
wide discretion in adopting redistricting plans. All the provisions of 7
are still premised on compliance with the proportionality provision. 45
However, the relators in Wilson v. Kasich could not allege violations of
the proportionality provision, because the apportionment plan was
commendably meticulous in its adherence to that provision.14  Beyond
proportionality, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio's construction of
§ 7's provisions leaves the apportionment board with immense and
practically unreviewable authority to reapportion. Not only is the
apportionment board entitled to violate the whole-county, county-
division, and unit-division provisions as long as it complies with the
district-preservation provision, but "compliance" with the district-
preservation provision does not literally mean that a district must be
preserved.147  This reading of the Ohio Constitution, coupled with
imposing the highest possible burden on challengers of decennial
apportionment plans, untethers the apportionment board from strict
compliance with any mandate other than the proportionality provision
and leaves Article XI virtually toothless.
C. Establishing Unconstitutionality
In the wake of Wilson v. Kasich, what would an unconstitutional
apportionment plan look like? Answering this question obviously calls
for speculation, because the decision rested on a specific set of facts and
was argued before a court whose composition had already changed less
than six months later. Nonetheless, certain generalizations can be made
by examining the principles set forth in the court's decision in order to
144. Id. at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7(A) ("To the extent consistent with the requirements of section
3..."); id. § 7(B) and (C) ("Where the requirements of section 3 of this Article cannot feasibly be
attained . ); id. § 7(D) ("[T]o the extent reasonably consistent with the requirements of section
3 .. . .").
146. See AN OHIO APPORTIONMENT PLAN FOR 2012-2022, September 30, 2011, 60-63, available
at https://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/reshape/GA/Apportionment-Engrossed.pdf
147. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 826 (holding that the apportionment board has "the authority .. . to
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explore the outer limits of the apportionment board's authority in a post-
Wilson v. Kasich Ohio.
First, future reapportionments can unarguably take political
considerations into account. If there was still any question before
Wilson v. Kasich, there certainly isn't anymore. Based on a fair reading
of Article XI's plain language, the court looked past the many
"smoking-gun" communications among the secretaries and board
members indicating that boundary lines were being drawn for partisan
gain. Instead, the court held that political considerations are only
unconstitutional when they "override the requirements of Article XI."
Given that Wilson v. Kasich was apparently not even a close case on this
issue (neither Justice Pfeifer nor Justice McGee Brown criticized the
court's political-neutrality holding in their dissents), for a future
reapportionment to be struck down on political gerrymandering grounds
it would have to be outright flagrant. And since the court could not
possibly determine whether political considerations overrode
constitutional requirements by looking at the subjective intent of the
apportionment board, it seems that an impermissibly political
reapportionment would have to be patently illegal or unconstitutional as
well. For good or ill, this renders political-motivation challenges to
apportionment plans virtually worthless, as the challenges would most
likely have to be accompanied by additional allegations that would
suffice individually (such as racial gerrymandering or obvious Article
XI violations).
Second, future reapportionments must follow at least one of the
mandates of § 7-geographical integrity under § 7(A)-(C) or district
continuity under § 7(D). Because the court held that it would "not order
respondents to correct the alleged violations of Sections 7(A), (B), and
(C) by committing a violation of Section 7(D),"l49 presumably some
part of § 7 must be followed. The apportionment board could therefore
follow the mandates of the district-preservation provision at the expense
of compliance with § 7(A)-(C), or vice versa, but it could not fail to
comply with any portion of Article XI, § 7.
Less clear, however, is how much latitude the court's construction of
the district-preservation provision will give future apportionment
boards. The court held that compliance with the district-preservation
provision does not require that districts be adopted in the precise form
they took in the previous apportionment scheme as long as the
"readopted" districts are "reasonably consistent" with the
proportionality provision.150 Unfortunately, the court does not attempt
148. Id. at 820.
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to define the boundaries of this discretion. Future challengers must
struggle with the question: how dissimilar is too dissimilar under the
district-preservation provision? Given that alterations to any one
district's boundaries would necessarily lead to changes in at least two
districts (after all, the difference would have to be accounted for
elsewhere), one would hope that significant deviations from the prior
reapportionment could not be protected by the district-preservation
provision. However, all the court says is that new districts adopted
under the district-preservation provision need not be "identical" to their
predecessor districts.' 51
A particularly troubling aspect of this wide discretion is its potential
impact on one of the most fundamental mandates of reapportionment:
the contiguity provision contained in the first clause of § 7(A).' 52 Read
literally, the court's decision allows violations of § 7(A) if these
violations are incidental to compliance with the district-preservation
provision.153  However, as discussed above, the district-preservation
provision was read to include a measure of discretion so that strict
preservation of districts is not mandatory.154 Would it be theoretically
possible, then, for an apportionment board to "readopt" a district under
the district-preservation provision but, in its discretion, alter it so that it
is not "composed of contiguous territory" or not bounded by "a single
non-intersecting continuous line"?155 This may seem preposterous, but
while such a configuration may be prima facie unconstitutional, the
standard is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt; and the court
has already held that alleged violations of § 7(A) are not
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt when they are a
consequence of compliance with certain other provisions. 5 6
Third, future reapportionments must follow the proportionality
provision. This seems to be the only hard-and-fast rule discussed by the
Court in Wilson v. Kasich. Although the apportionment board has the
discretion to follow certain Article XI provisions at the expense of
others, every provision is premised on compliance with the
proportionality provision. Indeed, failure to comply with the
proportionality provision might also constitute a violation of the one
person, one vote rule and would be actionable in federal courts as well
151. Id.
152. OHIO CONST. art. XL, § 7(A) ("Every House of Representatives district shall be compact and
composed of contiguous territory, and the boundary of each district shall be a single non-intersecting
continuous line.").
153. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 825.
154. Id. at 826.
155. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7(A).
156. Wilson, 981 N.E.2d at 826.
23
Smothers: Can You Ever Beat the Board? Challenges to Legislative Reapportio
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
as state court.'5 7  In addition, while the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is extremely deferential, it would be much easier to establish
unconstitutionality with quantifiable data. Whereas compliance with the
district-preservation provision after Wilson v. Kasich may be an
amorphous concept, compliance with the proportionality provision is a
matter of mathematics: each district is either within the allowable
variance from the ratio of representation or it is not. It therefore appears
that one of the most obvious ways future reapportionments will be
deemed unconstitutional is if they fail to comply with the proportionality
provision.
Finally, future reapportionments must be susceptible to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that they are unconstitutional. For all the reasons
discussed above, this will be a difficult burden to meet in most cases-
particularly when the alleged constitutional violations occur in a context
where the apportionment board is given considerable discretion, such as
§ 7. As Wilson v. Kasich shows, in some instances a violation of the
letter of the Ohio Constitution will not be sufficient. So, on top of all
everything else, future apportionment board decisions will only be
unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution when they are found to be
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
V. CONCLUSION: THE UNMOORED APPORTIONMENT BOARD
The five public officials who comprise the apportionment board
decided the composition of Ohio's House and Senate districts for the
next decade. Although their decision was not subject to legislative
approval, it was accorded the same deference as an enactment of the
duly elected, 132-member general assembly. Furthermore, these five
people and their successors (who may well have different political
affiliations ten years from now) were given the authority to choose how
they would comply with certain provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
Thus, their apportionment schemes are protected by the highest
presumption of constitutionality, and what it means for one of their
decisions to be unconstitutional in the first instance may be based on
context rather than the letter of the Ohio Constitution.158
157. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
158. Interestingly, notwithstanding the clear problems with Ohio's current reapportionment
system (problems that have been exacerbated by the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Wilson v.
Kasich), a 2012 ballot measure that proposed the creation of "a 12-member citizens commission to draw
new districts" was overwhelmingly defeated by Ohio voters. No on Issue 2, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL
ONLINE (Oct. 6, 2012, 9:16 PM), http://www.ohio.com/editorialleditorials/no-on-issue-2-1.339927; see
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The court's decision in Wilson v. Kasich enshrined this scheme and
cast serious doubt on the viability of future challenges to apportionment
board decisions. The court abdicated its constitutionally appointed
function to scrutinize challenged apportionment board decisions and
created a regime where only blatant constitutional violations are
susceptible to attack. Only time and future challenges to apportionment
plans will reveal the true scope of Wilson v. Kasich. For now it appears
that, except in the most egregious of circumstances, you can almost
never beat the board.
2012Results/20121106issue2.aspx. However, a number of organizations, like the League of Women
Voters of Ohio and Ohio Citizen Action, continue to advocate for reform in Ohio's redistricting system.
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